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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals in this matter is proper pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(e).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW: STANDARD OF APPELLATE
REVIEW; AND PRESERVATION OF ISSUES IN THE TRIAL COURT
The issues presented for review are as follows:
Issue No 1; whether the trial court committed reversible error when it
restricted Mr. Gallup's right to testify on his own behalf concerning where he was
on the day he allegedly committed the crimes of failing to respond to an officer's
signal, driving on a revoked or suspended license, and speeding, because such
testimony constituted an alibi defense which should have been disclosed ten days
prior to the trial, notwithstanding the plain language of the alibi statute which
states that a defendant may always testify on his own behalf concerning alibi.
Standard of Review: in order to challenge the trial court's conclusions of
law the appellant must show legal error by the court in its use of fixed principles
and rules of law, demonstrating that the court incorrectly selected, interpreted or
applied the law. State v. Pena, 869 P. 2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) ("Appellate review
of a trial court's determination of the law is usually characterized by the term
'correctness'"). Correctness means the appellate court decides the matter for itself
without deference in any degree to the trial court's determination of law. Id. at
935. The trial court's conclusions of law in a criminal case are reviewed for
1

correctness. State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, If 11, 162 P. 3d 1106. Further, the
trial court's interpretation of a statute is a question of law reviewed for correctness.
Harvey v. Cedar Hills City, 2010 UT 12, ^} 10, 127 P. 2d 246.
Preservation of the Issue: the issue was preserved in the trial court. (R: 186;
52-53, 55-56, 59, 61-63, 101-102)
Issue No, 2: if the trial court's interpretation of the alibi statute is correct,
whether the statute's application in this case violated Mr. Gallup"s constitutional
rights when it required him to give the State advance notice of his testimony and
when it precluded him from testifying concerning alibi because he failed to give
such notice.
Standard of Review: in order to challenge the trial court's conclusions of
law the appellant must show legal error by the court in its use of fixed principles
and rules of law, demonstrating that the court incorrectly selected, interpreted or
applied the law. State v. Pena, 869 P. 2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) ("Appellate review
of a trial court's determination of the law is usually characterized by the term
'correctness'"). Correctness means the appellate court decides the matter for itself
without deference in any degree to the trial court's determination of law. Id. at
935. The trial court's conclusions of law in a criminal case are reviewed for
correctness. State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, | 11, 162 P. 3d 1106. Whether the
trial court properly denied a defendant in a criminal case the right to confront the
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witnesses against him is a question of law reviewed for correctness. State v.
Gonzales, 2005 UT 72, \ 47, 125 P. 3d 878. Further, although underlying factual
matters are within the discretion of the trial court, whether a given set of facts
gives rise to a constitutional violation is a matter of law which the appellate court
reviews de novo. State v. Maas, 991 P. 2d 1108, 1111 (Utah App. 1999)
Preservation of the Issue: the issue was preserved in the trial court (R: 186;
52-53, 55-56, 59, 61-63, 101-102) and in any event would otherwise constitute
plain error. United States v. Burson, 952 F. 2d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 1991)
(holding that a violation of the Fifth Amendment constitutes plain error).
Issue No, 3: whether the prosecutor's questions and comments during his
case-in-chief, cross examination of Mr. Gallup, and closing argument, concerning
Mr. Gallup's exercise of his right to remain silent during the police investigation,
violated Mr. Gallup's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
Standard of Review: in order to challenge the trial court's conclusions of
law the appellant must show legal error by the court in its use of fixed principles
and rules of law, demonstrating that the court incorrectly selected, interpreted or
applied the law. State v. Pena, 869 P. 2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) ("Appellate review
of a trial court's determination of the law is usually characterized by the term
'correctness'"). Correctness means the appellate court decides the matter for itself
without deference in any degree to the trial court's determination of law. Id. at
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935. The trial court's conclusions of law in a criminal case are reviewed for
correctness. State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, f 11, 162 P. 3d 1106. Further,
although underlying factual matters are within the discretion of the trial court,
whether a given set of facts gives rise to a constitutional violation is a matter of
law which the appellate court reviews de novo. State v. Maas, 991 P. 2d 1108,
1111 (Utah App. 1999)
Preservation of the Issue: the issue was preserved in the trial court (R: 186;
14-15, 89, 101-102) and in any event would otherwise constitute plain error.
United States v. Burson, 952 F. 2d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that
violation of Fifth Amendment constitutes plain error).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES,
AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE
OF THE APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
U.S. Const, amend. V.
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or properly, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.

4

U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
STATUTE
Utah Code Ann. §77-14-2. Alibi - Notice Requirements - Witness Lists
(1) A defendant, whether or not written demand has been made, who intends to
offer evidence of an alibi shall, not less than 10 days before trial or at such other
time as the court may allow, file and serve on the prosecuting attorney a notice, in
writing, of his intention to claim alibi. The notice shall contain specific information
as to the place where the defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged
offense and, as particularly as is known to the defendant or his attorney, the names
and addresses of the witnesses by whom he proposes to establish alibi. The
prosecuting attorney, not more than five days after receipt of the list provided
herein or at such other time as the court may direct, shall file and serve the
defendant with the addresses, as particularly as are known to him, of the witnesses
the state proposes to offer to contradict or impeach the defendant's alibi evidence.
(2) The defendant and prosecuting attorney shall be under a continuing duty to
disclose the names and addresses of additional witnesses which come to the
attention of either party after filing their alibi witness lists.
(3) If a defendant or prosecuting attorney fails to comply with the requirements of
this section, the court may exclude evidence offered to establish or rebut alibi.
However, the defendant may always testify on his own behalf concerning alibi.
(4) The court may, for good cause shown, waive the requirements of this section.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arises from a criminal prosecution for a road traffic incident on
Interstate 15 which allegedly occurred on October 22, 2008. (R: 6)
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On April 1, 2009, about five months after the alleged incident, the State filed
an information charging Jeffrey Gallup (hereinafter "Mr. Gallup") with failing to
respond to an officer's signal (a third degree felony), driving on a suspended or
revoked license (a class B misdemeanor), and speeding (a class C misdemeanor).
(R: 1-2)
An initial appearance was held on May 13, 2009 (R: 14), and a preliminary
hearing was held on September 9, 2009. (R: 47)
At the preliminary hearing the court made a finding of probable cause and
bound the case over for trial. (R: 47)
An arraignment was held on September 23, 2009, where Mr. Gallup pled
"not guilty" to the charges against him. (R: 51)
A final pretrial conference was held on November 18, 2009. (R: 78)
A jury trial was held on January 5, 2010. (R: 125) The trial court granted
the State's motion to prevent Mr. Gallup from testifying concerning alibi and
denied Mr. Gallup's motion to exclude evidence concerning his pre-arrest silence.
(R: 186; 14-15, 59, 61, 63) The jury returned guilty verdicts against Mr. Gallup on
all counts. (R: 125)
A sentencing hearing was held on February 17, 2010, and the court
sentenced Mr. Gallup to an indeterminate term not to exceed five years in the Utah
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State Prison. (R: 167) Mr. Gallup is presently incarcerated in connection with this
case on appeal.
A notice of appeal was filed on March 17, 2010, along with a request for a
transcript of the trial proceedings. (R: 182)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about October 22, 2008 at approximately 11:22 pm, Trooper Jared
Clanton (hereinafter uthe trooper") was stationary in his squad car facing
northbound on 1-15 in Utah County at mile marker 285 (in Lehi near the point-ofthe-mountain) when he observed a speeding vehicle heading southbound in the far
right lane. (R: 186; 22) According to the trooper, the vehicle was traveling at 88
miles per hour in a 65 mile per hour zone. (R: 186; 23-25)
The trooper turned around and followed the vehicle. He activated his
overhead lights and the vehicle came to a halt at mile marker 282. (R: 186; 24)
The trooper communicated the vehicle's license plate number to dispatch and then
exited his squad car. (R: 186; 26)
On exiting his squad car the trooper noticed that the suspect vehicle was a
blue four-door BMW, that its rear and side door windows were tinted and difficult
to see through, and that the rearview mirror was rotated up and down instead of
side-to-side. (R: 186; 26, 40-41). According to the trooper, the squad car's
overhead lights and spotlight were shining on the back of the vehicle. This created
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a silhouette effect because the spotlight shone through the vehicle's rear window.
(R: 186; 25-26, 41)
The trooper grabbed his flash light, which was turned off at the time, and
approached the vehicle on the passenger side. (R: 186; 27) According to the
trooper, he was coming up on the rear passenger side door when he briefly
observed the driver to be a white male with brown hair in his thirties. (R: 186; 28,
49) The trooper admitted this could easily describe a large number of people in the
population. (R: 186; 41-42) However, before he could make a better identification
or talk to the unknown driver, the vehicle suddenly accelerated and sped away. (R:
186; 29) The trooper did not even have time to turn on his flashlight. (R: 186; 41)
Startled, the trooper ran back to his squad car and chased the vehicle, but he was
never able to keep up with it and he eventually lost sight of it. (R: 186; 29-31)
Via dispatch the trooper was able to ascertain the registered owner of the
vehicle as one Jeffrey Gallup (hereinafter, "Mr. Gallup"). (R: 186; 33) The
trooper obtained Mr. Gallup's telephone number and called him about one hour
after the incident at approximately 12:22 am in the early hours of the next morning.
(R: 186; 35, 77) According to the trooper a male voice answered the phone. The
trooper asked, "Is Mr. Jeffery Gallup there?" and the male voice answered, "This is
Jeffery." The trooper identified himself as "Trooper Clanton with Highway
Patrol" and asked Mr. Gallup if he would tell the trooper his location because he

g

wanted to meet with him to "talk" to Mr. Gallup "about an incident." There was a
brief moment of silence and Mr. Gallup then hung up the phone. (R: 186; 36)
The trooper did not file formal charges against Mr. Gallup until March of
2009, in spite of the incident allegedly occurring five months earlier. (R: 186; 44)
He stated that this was because the case was "weighing on [him]" and that he
"spoke with multiple people." (R: 186; 44)
Before the trial Mr. Gallup moved the court to exclude evidence of the
phone conversation arguing that it was irrelevant and inadmissible hearsay. The
court denied the motion. (R: 186; 3-4, 10-11) Mr. Gallup also moved the court to
exclude any testimony by the trooper that Mr. Gallup was silent and hung up the
phone after the trooper identified himself as a law enforcement officer to Mr.
Gallup and posed questions to Mr. Gallup about the incident. Mr. Gallup argued
that such testimony infringed his constitutional right against self incrimination and
to remain silent in the face of police questioning. The court denied this motion too,
but stated that the objection was preserved for the purposes of appeal. (R: 186; 1415)
During his case-in-chief the prosecutor elicited testimony from the trooper
that Mr. Gallup was silent and hung up the phone after the trooper identified
himself to Mr. Gallup and posed questions to him. (R: 186; 35-36)
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Following the prosecution's case Mr. Gallup informed the court that he
wanted to take the stand and testify. (R: 186; 52) At that point the prosecution
moved that any testimony by Mr. Gallup that he was somewhere else on the night
in question be excluded because it constituted an alibi defense, and Mr. Gallup had
not provided the prosecution with advance notice that his testimony would be that
he was somewhere else. (R: 186; 53)
Mr. Gallup argued that notwithstanding the notice requirements, the alibi
statute always allows a defendant to testify on his own behalf concerning alibi. (R:
186; 55) He also argued that in addition to this statutory right, he had the
fundamental and constitutional right to take the stand, explain his version of the
facts, and respond to the accusations against him, by virtue of his status as an
accused individual in a criminal prosecution initiated by the State. Further, he also
argued that as the defendant he did not have the burden of proof, and that requiring
him to give the State advance notice of his own testimony violated his
constitutional right to remain silent. (R: 186; 61-62)
After hearing argument the trial court held that any testimony placing Mr.
Gallup somewhere else was an alibi defense and was therefore precluded because
he had failed to provide advance written notice of the subject matter of his
testimony to the State. (R: 186; 59, 61, 63) Further, that the third subsection of the
alibi statute permitting a defendant to "always testify on his own behalf concerning
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alibi" did not negate the previous subsections governing notice, and that Mr.
Gallup should have given advance notice of his own testimony if it consisted of
placing him somewhere else, regardless of whether he intended on offering
evidence other than his own testimony to prove that alibi. (R: 186; 63)
Mr. Gallup then took the stand and testified that his vehicle was grey (not
blue like the trooper said) and that the rear window was tinted with approximately
thirty-five percent light diffusion. (R: 186; 25, 75) He also testified that the
trooper called him using a blocked number and identified himself to Mr. Gallup as
a law enforcement officer before asking him questions. (R: 186; 77) There was
some testimony from Mr. Gallup that he may have loaned his vehicle out on the
night in question (R: 186; 76), that he did not recall being in Utah County that
night, and that he was not pulled over by a trooper that night. (R: 186; 78)
However, he did not testify concerning where he was that night because the court
had already barred him from doing so. (R: 186; 59, 61, 63)
The prosecutor then cross examined Mr. Gallup and questioned him about
his silence in the face of questioning by the trooper, repeatedly asking Mr. Gallup
questions like, "didn't it seem important to talk to the officer . . . about the
incident?", "didn't it seem important to ask the officer more about what he was
calling about?", "did you ask the officer, 'hey, why are you calling me?", "why

11

didn't you respond?", "why did you hang up?" and "did you then follow up with
him . . . and ask more questions, or did you just hang up on him?" (R: 186; 79-80)
During closing argument the prosecutor commented to the jury that, "if there
was some sort of explanation he could offer [the trooper] to get him away from
realizing that he was the real driver, that was the opportunity to tell [], and he
didn't." The prosecutor made other comments such as, "when he had an
opportunity within [] an hour of the incident, he failed to take that opportunity to
talk to the officer about the incident, to explain it away somehow" and "as a result.
.. I say you find him guilty." (R: 186; 82-83)
During rebuttal the prosecutor told the jury, "he hung up the phone. Is that
reasonable to believe t h a t . . . he was just exercising his right to remain silent?"
"Did he say, T decided to exercise my right to remain silent?" (R: 186; 89) At
that point Mr. Gallup objected arguing that he was not required to use such words
and that the prosecutor's comments were inappropriate. The court overruled the
objection while at the same time stating, "Although I think enough's been said."
The prosecutor then concluded his argument with these words: "Hanging up the
phone, ladies and gentlemen, showed his consciousness of guilt" (R: 186; 89)
The jury subsequently found Mr. Gallup guilty on all counts. (R: 186; 97)
However, during deliberation the jury asked the court a question wanting to know
where Mr. Gallup claimed to be on the night in question. The court responded that

12

such testimony by Mr. Gallup had been precluded by the court's earlier ruling. (R:
186; 93-94)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court committed reversible error by restricting Mr. Gallup's
statutory and constitutional right to testify on his own behalf when it ruled that Mr.
Gallup could not testify that he was somewhere else at the time of the alleged
crime. (R: 186; 63)
While Mr. Gallup did not provide the State with written advance notice that
he would testify he was somewhere else, the plain language of the alibi statute
unequivocally provides that notwithstanding the notice requirement a defendant
always has the right to testify on his own behalf concerning alibi. Utah Code Ann.
§77-14-2. The penalty for noncompliance with the notice provision is the
exclusion of any witnesses the defendant would call or evidence he would
otherwise offer to prove that alibi, but never his own testimony concerning alibi.
This rule is the same in other jurisdictions.
The right to testify is also a fundamental and constitutional right protected
by and enshrined in the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, and its infraction can never be treated as harmless error.
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Further, requiring Mr. Gallup to provide the State with written advance
notice of his testimony violates his Fifth Amendment right against self
incrimination.
The prosecutor committed reversible error during the State's case-in-chief,
cross-examination of Mr. Gallup, and closing argument, when he posed questions
and made comments about Mr. Gallup's exercise of his right to remain silent in the
face of police questioning. (R: 186; 35-36, 79-80, 82-83, 89) The trial court also
committed error when it denied Mr. Gallup's motion to exclude that evidence and
when it failed to sustain Mr. Gallup's later objection and give a curative
instruction. (R: 186; 14-15, 89).
The right to remain silent is enshrined in the Fifth Amendment and extends
to pre-arrest, pre-Miranda noncustodial situations when witnesses and suspects are
first contacted by law enforcement officers. Mr. Gallup was silent and hung up the
phone after the trooper called him, identified himself as a law enforcement officer,
and asked Mr. Gallup questions about the incident. This constituted an invocation
of his privilege against self incrimination. Mere silence should be sufficient to
invoke the privilege, and no special combination of words should be required.
At trial the prosecutor used Mr. Gallup's silence against him by expressly
informing the jury that it showed he was guilty and had a "consciousness of guilt."
(R: 186; 89) The prosecutor did not wait for Mr. Gallup to open the door by taking

14

the stand, but introduced that evidence during the State's case-in-chief. (R: 186;
35-36) As a result, Mr. Gallup was compelled to waive his right under the Fifth
Amendment, take the stand, and subject himself to cross-examination. (R: 186;
52, 54, 56)
These two errors considered alone or together, constitute reversible error
because they are substantial and prejudicial. They are substantial because they
divested Mr. Gallup of important statutory and constitutional rights such as the
right to testify on one's own behalf concerning alibi, the right to testify in general,
the due process of law, the right to confront witnesses, and the right against self
incrimination and to remain silent in the face of police questioning. They are
prejudicial because the State's one witness never specifically identified Mr. Gallup
at the crime scene and the State relied heavily on the exclusion of Mr. Gallup's
alibi defense as well as his silence in order to prove its case. Accordingly, this
court should not have confidence in the outcome and the verdicts should be
reversed.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
RESTRICTED MR. GALLUP'S RIGHT TO TESTIFY ON HIS OWN
BEHALF CONCERNING WHERE HE WAS AT THE TIME THE
ALLEGED CRIME WAS COMMITTED, WHEN THE ALIBI STATUTE
PLAINLY STATES THAT NOTWITHSTANDING A DEFENDANT'S
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH ITS REQUIREMENTS CONCERNING
ADVANCE NOTICE OF ALIBI, "THE DEFENDANT MAY ALWAYS
TESTIFY ON HIS OWN BEHALF CONCERNING ALIBI"
15

The Utah alibi statute is found at Utah Code Ann. §77-14-2 and states in
pertinent part,
A defendant. .. who intends 10 offer evidence of an alibi shall, not
less than ten days before trial. . . file and serve on the prosecuting
attorney a notice, in writing, of his intention to claim alibi. The notice
shall contain specific information as to the place where the defendant
claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense and . . . the
names and addresses of the witnesses by whom he proposes to
establish alibi.
The statute then provides that,
If a defendant. . . fails to comply with the requirements of this
section, the court may exclude evidence offered to establish [] alibi.
However, the defendant may always testify on his own behalf
concerning alibi.
(Emphasis added). The issue of whether a defendant is entitled to testify on
his own behalf concerning alibi is a question of statutory construction which the
appellate court reviews de novo for correctness without deference to the trial
court's interpretation. Harvey v. Cedar Hills City, 2010 UT 12, % 10, 127 P. 2d
246. When interpreting a statute the court must look first to the "plain language"
of the statute to determine its meaning, and venture beyond the four comers of the
statute only when its language is ambiguous. Gohler v. Wood, 919 P. 2d 561, 56263 (Utah 1996); see also State v. Johnson, 224 P. 3d 720, 728 (Utah App. 2009).
In the instant case the statute is unambiguous. It provides that the sanction
for failing to file a notice of alibi is the exclusion of extrinsic evidence offered to
prove alibi such as - most commonly - witness testimony. It does not preclude the
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defendant from testifying because the statute clearly and unambiguously states
that, "however" i.e. notwithstanding his failure to comply with the notice
requirements or, regardless of the fact that he did not provide notice, "the
defendant may always testify on his own behalf concerning alibi." In other words,
the defendant may always assert alibi during his own testimony on the witness
stand even if he has not provided the State with advance written notice that he was
intending to raise an alibi defense. The sanction for failure to comply is that he
cannot call witnesses or offer additional evidence to prove that alibi.
The case law and legal rules in this state and other jurisdictions support this
interpretation. In State v. Maestas, 815 P. 2d 1319, 1325 (Utah App. 1991) this
court held that since the defendant did not provide advance notice of alibi the trial
court properly excluded testimony by any alibi witnesses. (Emphasis added). In
People v. Peace, 256 A.D. 2d 1014, 683 NYS 2d 317 (3d Dept 1998) the court
held that if it is only the defendant who testifies to being elsewhere than at the
crime scene, no alibi notice is required. In People v. Cuevas, 67 A.D. 2d 219, 414
NYS 2d 520 (1st Dept 1979) the court held that a defendant may always testify as
to who he was with, though that particular witness may be barred from testifying.
Further, Rule 14 of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure governing
pretrial discovery reads similar to the Utah statute when it states in part,
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The judge may . . . order that the defendant serve upon the prosecutor
a written notice . . . of his or her intention to offer a defense of alibi.
The notice . . . shall state the specific place or places at which the
defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense and
the names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom the defense
intends to rely to establish the alibi.
Upon the failure of either party to comply with the requirements
of this rule, the judge may exclude the testimony of any
undisclosed witness offered by such party as to the defendants
absence from or presence at the scene of the alleged offense. This
rule shall not limit the right of the defendant to testify.
(Emphasis added). The plain meaning of the Utah alibi statute, like similar
statutes and rules in other jurisdictions, is that a defendant's failure to comply with
the notice requirement precludes him from offering extrinsic evidence to prove
alibi - such as the testimony of additional witnesses - but it never precludes him
from testifying on his own behalf concerning where he was on the date and time of
the alleged crime. Therefore the trial committed error when it interpreted and
applied the statute to the contrary and restricted Mr. Gallup's testimony so that he
could not testify as to where he was on the date and time in question.
In State v. Ortiz, 712 P. 2d 218 (Utah 1985) the court held that the
overriding consideration in evaluating any notice of alibi claim must be the
avoidance of unfair surprise or prejudice, and not the exaltation of technical
formalities. Further, in State v. Haddenham, 585 P. 2d 447 (Utah 1978) the court
stated that the effect of not filing a notice of alibi witness (note how the court
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described it) is largely discretionary with the court, which may waive the
requirement for good cause shown.
In the instant case Mr. Gallup did not suddenly announce that he intended to
call any additional witnesses or offer extrinsic evidence to prove that he was
somewhere else. The alibi consisted of his testimony only. The prosecutor was
not surprised by this because Mr. Gallup had already pled not guilty, had obviously
notified the court and prosecutor of his intention to go to trial and contest the
charges, and it was the prosecutor - not the defense - who first raised the alibi issue
just after Mr. Gallup stated his intention to take the stand and testify. Therefore the
prosecutor was already aware that if Mr. Gallup testified he would most probably
deny being the driver of the vehicle and that he would testify that he was
somewhere else. The prosecutor merely raised an objection to a technical
formality at the last minute and the court incorrectly sustained him.
Further, even if the court correctly held that the alibi statute precluded Mr.
Gallup from testifying about alibi, it abused its discretion in not waiving the
requirement for good cause when Mr. Gallup informed the court that his decision
to testify was a last minute one based on the court's earlier denial of his motion to
exclude introduction of the phone call between him and the trooper, as well as the
court thereby permitting the prosecutor to question the trooper about Mr. Gallup's
silence during the State's case-in-chief. (R: 186; 55-56) The court should have
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waived the notice requirement for good cause shown and its failure to do so
constitutes an abuse of discretion.
The court's error - not allowing Mr. Gallup to testify on his own behalf
concerning alibi - is reversible because it was substantial and prejudicial. State v.
Mora, 2003 UT App 117, f 22, 69 P. 3d 838. It was substantial because it
prevented him from fully testifying from the stand, explaining his version of the
facts, and confronting the witnesses and accusations leveled against him. This is
not only a statutory right but, as explained below, it is also a fundamental and
constitutional one. Further, the error was prejudicial because there is a reasonable
likelihood that without it there may have been a different result, and that likelihood
is high enough to undermine the appellate court's confidence in the verdict. State
v. Johnson, 2009 UT App 382, \ 37, 224 P. 3d 720; see also State v. Ott, 2010 UT
1, f 40. There were only two witnesses at the trial, the trooper and Mr. Gallup, and
at the end of the trial during deliberation the jury was curious enough to ask the
court why Mr. Gallup had not testifying concerning his whereabouts on the night
in question. The court told the jury that it had previously excluded the introduction
of that evidence. (R: 186; 93-94) The only evidence the State had against Mr.
Gallup was that he was the registered owner of the vehicle and that the trooper had
very briefly identified the driver as a man with brown hair in this thirties. (R: 186;
28, 33, 49) The trooper admitted this description could easily describe a lot of
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people in the population and that he made this brief identification at night from just
behind the rear passenger side door of the vehicle and through tinted windows
without the benefit of his flashlight. (R: 186; 22, 26-28, 40-42, 49)
Excluding Mr. Gallup's testimony concerning alibi was a substantial
violation of his statutory and constitutional right to testify and he was prejudiced
because its exclusion significantly strengthened the State's case against him given
the scant evidence in its possession. As a result, there is a reasonable and high
likelihood that the verdict may have been different had Mr. Gallup been permitted
to testify on his own behalf concerning alibi, especially considering that during
deliberation the jury asked the court a question about his alibi. Therefore, Mr.
Gallup's conviction should be reversed.
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE ALIBI STATUTE
REQUIRING MR. GALLUP TO GIVE THE STATE ADVANCE WRITTEN
NOTICE OF THE CONTENT OF HIS OWN TESTIMONY BECAUSE IT
INCLUDED AN ALIBI DEFENSE, AND PREVENTING HIM FROM
TESTIFYING ON HIS OWN BEHALF CONCERNING ALIBI WHEN HE
FAILED TO GIVE SUCH NOTICE, CONSTITUTED A VIOLATION OF
MR. GALLUP'S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS UNDER
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
In the case of Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 107 S. Ct 2704, 97 L. Ed 2d 37
(1987) the United States Supreme Court held that there is a constitutional right to
testify on one's own behalf at a criminal trial, and that while this right to testify is
not without limitation, any restrictions placed upon it may not be arbitrary or
disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve. In Specht v. Patterson,
21

386 U.S. 605, 87 S. Ct 1209, 18 L. Ed 2d 326 (1967) the same court held that the
right of an accused to be heard on his own behalf is a fundamental principle of
modern jurisprudence and that, at a minimum, due process requires that a
defendant in a criminal case have an opportunity to be heard and to offer evidence
of his own. In State v. Morehouse, 748 P. 2d 217 (Utah App. 1988) this court held
that the defendant's right to testify in a criminal proceeding against him is so basic
to a fair trial that its infraction can never be treated as harmless error. Id. at 223.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
provide that a person cannot be deprived of his or her liberty without the due
process of law, and the above cited cases apply these due process principles to
defendants in a criminal proceeding by providing that every defendant receive a
fair trial and enjoy his or her day in court. While a defendant who fails to satisfy
the notice requirements of the Utah alibi statute can be precluded from offering
evidence to prove alibi, the fundamental constitutional right under the due process
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to offer evidence on his own
behalf and by his own testimony, tending to establish his innocence (whether or
not he asserts alibi) cannot and should not be abridged as a penalty for
noncompliance with the statute. Indeed, the Utah alibi statute recognizes this
constitutional right and expressly enshrines it when it states that, "However, the
defendant may always testify on his own behalf concerning alibi." (Emphasis

added) The statutory penalty for noncompliance is exclusion of the testimony of
those witnesses the defendant would otherwise call to establish the alibi, but never
his own testimony concerning alibi. Rule 14 of the Massachusetts Rules of
Criminal Procedure says exactly the same thing when it states that "this rule shall
not limit the right of the defendant to testify." These cases, statutes and rules
provide that while excluding the testimony of additional witnesses to prove alibi is
an appropriate sanction for noncompliance, limiting the defendant's testimony
concerning alibi is an arbitrary and disproportionate limitation on his constitutional
right to take the stand and testify. By restricting Mr. Gallup's statutory and
constitutional right to testify on his own behalf concerning alibi the trial court
denied Mr. Gallup a fair trial and an opportunity to be heard and confront the
witnesses and evidence against him. He was subsequently found guilty and
incarcerated and therefore deprived of his liberty without the due process of law.
Finally, the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides that "no person ..
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
Therefore, the trial court's interpretation of the statute requiring Mr. Gallup to give
written advance notice of his own testimony to the State violated his right against
self incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, and the court's order precluding
him from testifying as to where he was at the time of the alleged crime because of
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his failure to provide said notice violated his right to due process under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments.
In conclusion, this court should find as a matter of constitutional
jurisprudence that an accused individual may always testify concerning where he
was at the time of the alleged crime, and that he is not required to give the State
advance notice of his own testimony. The trial court erred and the error is
prejudicial and reversible for all the same reasons outlined at the end of part one of
this argument. However, this court has already held that the defendant's right to
testify in a criminal proceeding against him is so basic to a fair trial that its
infraction can never be treated as harmless error. See Morehouse, 748 P. 2d at 223.
III. THE PROSECUTOR'S INNAPROPRIATE QUESTIONS AND
COMMENTS DURING HIS CASE-IN-CHIEF, CROSS EXAMINATION OF
MR. GALLUP, AND CLOSING ARGUMENT, CONCERNING MR.
GALLUP'S EXERCISE OF HIS PRE-ARREST RIGHT TO REMAIN
SILENT WHILE BEING INVESTIGATED FOR A CRIME, VIOLATED
MR. GALLUP'S FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT AGAINST SELF
INCRIMINATION
The issue is whether the prosecutor improperly used Mr. Gallup's pre-arrest
silence against him at trial. While there is a plethora of case law surrounding the
issue of post-Miranda, post-arrest silence, the case law concerning pre-Miranda,
pre-arrest silence is more limited. Fortunately, courts in various jurisdictions,
including Utah and the Tenth Circuit, have affirmatively held that a criminal
defendant's pre-arrest silence cannot be used against him. These courts have held
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that pre-arrest silence is inadmissible because admitting pre-arrest silence would
pressure defendants to take the witness stand at trial in order to explain their prior
silence. See Combs v. Coyle, 205 F. 3d 269, 285 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that if a
defendant cannot avoid introduction of his prior silence by refusing to testify, he
would be under substantial pressure to waive the privilege against self
incrimination later at trial in order to explain his silence). This creates a "veritable
Catch 22." See State v. Fend, 325 N.W. 2d 703, 711 (Wis. 1982); see also State v.
Leach, 807 N.E. 2d 335, 341 (Ohio 2004) (holding that use of pre-arrest silence
would force a defendant to either permit the jury to infer guilt from his silence or
otherwise surrender his right not to testify). Permitting prosecutors to use a
defendant's pre-arrest silence against him would mean that suspects and witnesses
in criminal investigations would be compelled to speak, and thereby incriminate
themselves when first contacted by law enforcement, effectively leading to a police
state. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S 231, 250 (1980); see also State v. Easter,
922 P. 2d 1285, 1290 (Wash, 1996) (holding that a defendant has effectively lost
his right to remain silent when the state may later comment that he did not speak
up prior to arrest).
In United States v. Burson, 952 F. 2d 1196 (10th Cir. 1991) the trial court
admitted testimony by two IRS criminal investigators concerning the defendant's
silence when questioned by them. The defendant was convicted and he

25

subsequently appealed. The circuit court stated that the invocation of the privilege
against self incrimination must be given a liberal construction, that it does not
require any special combination of words, and that it can be asserted in any
investigatory proceeding regardless of whether the person being questioned has
been arrested, is in custody, or has been informed of his rights under Miranda.
Applying these principles the court stated that mere silence in the face of
questioning by law enforcement officers constitutes an invocation of the privilege
against self incrimination. Id. at 1200-1201. The court held, citing the Griffin rule,
that once a defendant invokes his right to remain silent it is impermissible for the
prosecution to subsequently make reference to it. Id. Finally, having found error,
the court stated that there are five factors to consider in determining whether
prosecutorial questioning and comments on a defendant's pre-arrest silence
constitute reversible error. First, the way in which the prosecution used the
defendant's silence (e.g. cross-examining the defendant concerning his silence for
impeachment purposes 'once' he surrenders his privilege by taking the witness
stand and testifying is permissible in limited circumstances); second, who elected
to pursue the line of questioning; third, the quantum of other evidence indicative of
guilt; fourth, the intensity and frequency of the reference; and fifth, the availability
of the trial judge of an opportunity to grant a motion for a mistrial or give curative
instructions. Id. Ultimately in Burson the court found harmless error because the
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IRS agents did not testify as to any of the questions they propounded to the
defendant, the prosecution made no reference to the defendant's silence in closing
argument, and the record evidenced a sincere and active concern by the trial court
to protect the defendant. Id. at 1201.
In 1993 this court had the opportunity to visit the issue of pre-arrest silence
in the case of State v. Palmer, 860 P. 2d 339 (Utah App. 1993). In this case
testimony implicating the defendant's pre-arrest silence when questioned by a
detective was admitted into evidence during the State's case-in-chief, crossexamination of the defendant, and closing argument. The prosecutor argued that
the defendant's choice to remain silent showed a "consciousness of guilt." He also
made statements in closing such as, "what is so incredibly difficult about saying,
'No, I didn't do it?' Why didn't he do that? Because he knows he was guilty, that's
why." The jury subsequently convicted him. Id. at 341-42, 346. On appeal this
court held that evidence of the defendant's pre-Miranda, pre-arrest silence was not
admissible to demonstrate that the defendant had consciousness of guilt and
therefore violated his right against self incrimination under the Fifth Amendment.
Id. at 349-50. In reaching this conclusion the court stated that the privilege against
self incrimination is based on numerous social policies, among them,
"our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system
of criminal justice . . . our sense of fair play which dictates 4a fair
state-individual balance . . . by requiring the government in its contest
with the individual to shoulder the entire load' . . . our respect for . . .
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the right of each individual 'to a private enclave where he may lead a
private life' . . . [and] our realization that the privilege, while
sometimes 'a shelter to the guilty/ is often 'a protection to the
innocent.'"
Id. at 347. The court further stated that the privilege could be asserted in any
type of proceeding, including the investigatory phase of a crime before arrest,
custody or Miranda warnings, and could apply to "any disclosures which the
witness may reasonably apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecution or
which could lead to other evidence that might be so used." Id. The court noted
that while the prosecution may use a defendant's pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence
for impeachment purposes on cross-examination, such questioning is permitted
only after the defendant 'opens the door' by taking the witness stand, and that the
mere act of taking the stand does not independently make the defendant's silence
relevant. Id. at 348. See also United States v. Caro, 637 F. 2d 869 (2nd Cir. 1981)
(holding that a suspect's pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence cannot be used in the
government's case-in-chief). The court also stated that the test used for
determining whether the prosecutor's remarks are improper and constitute error is
whether those remarks called to the jurors' attention matters which they would not
normally be justified in considering in reaching a verdict. The court held that
improper statements will require reversal if they are determined to be harmful. Id.
at 342; see also State v. Emmett, 839 P. 2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992).
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In the instant case Mr. Gallup had previously moved the court to exclude
testimony by the trooper that he remained silent and hung up the phone after the
trooper identified himself as a law enforcement officer and told Mr. Gallup that he
wanted to meet with him to talk to and question him about an incident. (R: 186;
14-15) The court overruled the motion and the State went on to use Mr. Gallup's
silence against him at trial, ultimately culminating in guilty verdicts. Id. This was
error. The Tenth Circuit has held that mere silence in the face of police
questioning by law enforcement officers constitutes an invocation of the right
against self incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. See Burson, 952 F. 2d at
1200-1201. Further, this court has held that the right extends to the investigatory
phase of a crime before arrest and to any disclosures which a suspect or witness
may reasonably believe could be used against him. See Palmer, 860 P. 2d at 347;
see also Burson, 952 F. 2d at 1200-01 (holding that the right can be asserted in any
investigatory proceeding regardless of whether the person being questioned has
been arrested). The circuit court in Burson and this court in Palmer both found
that the Griffin rule, making it impermissible for the prosecution to refer to the
defendant's post-arrest, post-Miranda exercise of his right to remain silent also
applied once the defendant invoked that right, even if by the act of mere silence in
the face of police questioning, to pre-arrest, pre-Miranda situations. Id.

Obviously, Mr. Gallup was not in custody when the trooper questioned him
because he was being questioned by the trooper over the phone and the trooper had
no idea where Mr. Gallup was. (R: 186; 35-36) However, the trooper had first
identified himself to Mr. Gallup as a law enforcement officer "with Highway
Patrol" and told Mr. Gallup that he wanted to know his location so that he could
meet with and "talk" to him "about an incident." (R: 186; 36). This situation is
similar to that in Burson when the two IRS agents questioned the defendant in a
noncustodial investigatory setting. Like the defendant in that case Mr. Gallup was
entitled to exercise his right to remain silent in the face of questioning even if by
the act of mere silence. This is what Mr. Gallup did when he remained silent and
then hung up the phone. (R: 186; 36) The right should be given a liberal
construction (applying it to initial noncustodial contact with law enforcement) and
it should not require any special combination of words (mere silence in the face of
police questioning should be sufficient). See Burson, 952 F. 2d at 1200-01.
While a defendant's silence is admissible in limited circumstances to
impeach him on cross-examination, it is not admissible as part of the State's direct
case or to demonstrate consciousness of guilt, See Palmer, 860 P. 2d at 347.
However, this is exactly what the prosecution did after the court denied Mr.
Gallup's motion. The prosecutor elicited testimony from the trooper concerning
Mr. Gallup's silence during the State's case-in-chief, and before Mr. Gallup

opened the door by deciding to take the stand and testify. (R: 186; 35-36). During
cross-examination the prosecutor repeatedly badgered Mr. Gallup about his
silence, impliedly suggesting to the jury that Mr. Gallup would not have remained
silent had he been innocent. (R: 186; 79-80) During closing the prosecutor
expressly told the jury that Mr. Gallup's silence in the face of police questioning
showed that he had a guilty consciousness. He told the jury, "Hanging up the
phone, ladies and gentleman, showed his consciousness of guilt." (R: 186; 89).
These are the last words the jury heard before retiring to the jury room to
deliberate. Id. In Palmer the prosecutor argued in closing that the defendant's
choice to remain silent showed a "consciousness of guilt." See Palmer, 860 P. 2d
at 341-42, 346. These are the exact words the prosecutor used in the instance case
("Hanging up the phone, ladies and gentlemen, showed his consciousness of
guilt"), (R: 186; 89), and in Palmer the court held that such a statement made at
closing was inappropriate and therefore reversible error. Id. There are other
similarities between the two cases. In Palmer the prosecutor commented to the
jury that, "what is so incredibly difficult about saying, 'No, I didn't do it? Why
didn't he do that? Because he knows he was guilty, that's why.'" Id. In the instant
case the prosecutor told the jury, "If there was some sort of explanation he could
offer . . . that was the opportunity to t e l l . . . and he didn't," "he failed to take that
opportunity to talk to the officer about the incident, to explain it away somehow"
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and "as a result... I say you find him guilty." (R: 186; 82-83). The prosecutor
also told the jury, "is that reasonable to believe t h a t . . . he was just exercising his
right to remain silent... did he say, T decided to exercise my right to remain
silent?'" (R: 186; 89). However, as already stated, invocation of the right against
self incrimination requires no special combination of words and mere silence is
sufficient. See Burson, 952 F. 2d at 1200-01. Further, applying the Griffin rule, it
is impermissible for the prosecution to even refer to any Fifth Amendment right
during trial once that right has been invoked and even if the accused did not use the
words, "Fifth Amendment" or "right to remain silent." Id.
As well as following the rules and precedents established by the
aforementioned case law, this court should make it inappropriate as a matter of
sound public policy for the State to comment, during its direct case and closing
argument, on a defendant's pre-arrest silence. The case law recognizes that
admitting pre-arrest silence puts defendants in a Catch 22 situation. They either
permit the jury to infer guilt from silence or they else waive their Fifth Amendment
right against self incrimination, take the stand, and testify thereby subjecting
themselves to cross-examination concerning their prior silence. See Combs v.
Coyle, 205 F. 3d at 285; see also Fend, 325 N.W. 2d at 711; Leach, 807 N.E. 2d at
341; Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S at 250; Easter, 922 P. 2d at 1290. This is
exactly what happened to Mr. Gallup, who decided to take the stand and testify at
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the last minute after the court denied his motion to exclude evidence of the phone
call between him and the trooper, including the fact that he remained silent and
hung up the phone after the trooper identified himself and posed questions to Mr.
Gallup. (R: 186;14-15, 52,54-56). Permitting the State to get away with making
such comments during trial would mean that all witnesses and suspects would feel
compelled to speak when first contacted by law enforcement. This would lead to a
police state and effectively destroy the right to remain silent in any pre-arrest, preMiranda situation, which is what happened to Mr. Gallup. This court addressed
that concern when it stated that, "merely because an individual does not need to be
advised of his right to remain silent until he is subject to a custodial interrogation
does not mean he should be penalized for invoking that right earlier" and that
allowing prosecutors to use such silence later on in court "would encourage the
authorities to refrain from issuing Miranda warnings as long as possible in an
attempt to generate either inferential evidence of guilt from silence or an admission
prior to custodial interrogation." The court surmised that, "providing law
enforcement an incentive to withhold Miranda warnings would be poor public
policy and contrary to the spirit of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence." See Palmer,
860 P. 2d at 349.
As stated above, the privilege against self incrimination is based on
numerous social policies such as preference for an accusatorial system rather than

an inquisitorial one, a fair balance between the state and the individual, requiring
the government to shoulder the burden of proof, and the right of the individual to a
private enclave where he may lead a private life. Id. at 347. In the instant case the
prosecutor's comments suggested to the jury that Mr. Gallup should have spoken
up when first questioned by law enforcement, that he should have spoken up in a
an effort to prove his innocence, and that he really was not entitled to retreat
behind his private enclave or private life when questioned by law enforcement.
This approach is reminiscent of the Napoleonic inquisitorial system of justice
where the defendant shoulders the burden of proving his innocence and where
individual rights are merely privileges bestowed by the state, rather than principles
of natural law enshrined in written constitutions. It stands in stark contrast to the
Anglo-American system in which the individual enjoys natural rights and where
the state always carries the burden of proof.
The prosecutor's comments constitute reversible error. In Burson the court
held that there are five factors to consider in determining whether the prosecutors
comments constitute reversible error, namely, the way in which the prosecution
used the defendant's silence, who elected to pursue the line of questioning, the
quantum of other evidence indicative of guilt, the intensity and frequency of the
comments, and the trial court's opportunity to give curative instructions or grant a
mistrial. Id. at 1201. In the instant case it was the prosecutor who introduced

evidence concerning Mr. Gallup's silence during the State's case-in-chief, (R: 186;
36-35) and he used it to impliedly and expressly suggest that Mr. Gallup's silence
meant he was guilty. (R: 186; 82-83, 89). The prosecutor's made these comments
with much frequency during his case-in-chief, on cross-examination, and during
his closing and rebuttal arguments. (R: 186; 35-36, 79-80, 82-83, 89). The
questions and comments were intense. On cross he asked Mr. Gallup, "didn't it
seem important to talk to the officer . . . about the incident?", "didn't it seem
important to ask the officer more about what he was calling about?", "did you ask
the officer, 'hey, why are you calling me?", "why didn't you respond?", "why did
you hang up?" and "did you then follow up with him . . . and ask more questions,
or did you just hang up on him?" (R: 186; 79-80) During closing and rebuttal he
made comments like, "if there was some sort of explanation he could offer [the
trooper] to get him away from realizing that he was the real driver, that was the
opportunity to tell [], and he didn't," "when he had an opportunity within [] an
hour of the incident, he failed to take that opportunity to talk to the officer about
the incident, to explain it away somehow," "as a result... I say you find him
guilty," "he hung up the phone. Is that reasonable to believe t h a t . . . he was just
exercising his right to remain silent?" "Did he say, 'I decided to exercise my right
to remain silent?" and "Hanging up the phone, ladies and gentlemen, showed his
consciousness of guilt." (R: 186; 82-83, 89) Mr. Gallup objected to these
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comments but the court overruled him while at the same time stating, "Although I
think enough's been said." Id. This can hardly be considered a curative
instruction. Further, there was very little other evidence which the State had to
prove that Mr. Gallup was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The trooper merely
identified the driver as a white man with brown hair in his mid thirties. He readily
admitted this description would apply to a lot of people. It was made very briefly
at night from just behind the rear passenger side door and through tinted windows.
The rearview mirror was positioned so that he could not see the reflection of the
driver's face. The trooper had forgotten to turn on his flashlight, and his overhead
spot light created a silhouette effect. (R: 186; 25-31, 40-42, 49) The only
evidence he had implicating Mr. Gallup was that he was the registered owner of
the vehicle, (R: 186; 33) and the fact that Mr. Gallup was silent and hung up the
phone after he questioned him (R: 186; 35-36, 77). This probably explains why he
waited almost five months to finally charge Mr. Gallup. (R: 186; 44). The trooper
stated that the case had been weighing on him and that he needed to talk to a lot of
people about it. (R: 186; 44). Also, unlike the court in Burson which found
harmless error because the prosecution made no reference to the defendant's
silence in closing and the record evidenced a sincere and active concern by the trial
court to protect the defendant, Id. at 1201, here the prosecutor did make reference

to Mr. Gallup's silence during closing, and the record is devoid of any effort by the
trial court to protect Mr. Gallup's constitutional rights.
The error is substantial and prejudicial. It divested Mr. Gallup of his right to
remain silent and lent heavily to the State's case against him, especially
considering that the evidence they did have - a brief generic identification coupled
with the fact that Mr. Gallup was the registered owner of the suspect vehicle - may
not have been sufficient to prove that he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
operating the vehicle on the night in question. It is no wonder the State sought to
use his silence against him and prevent him from testifying as to where he was. Its
case may have been even harder to prove had Mr. Gallup not taken the stand and
subjected himself to cross-examination. However, the court incorrectly permitted
the State to question the trooper about Mr. Gallup's silence during its case-in-chief,
and therefore Mr. Gallup was compelled to waive his privilege against self
incrimination and take the stand to testify. The court then severely restricted his
testimony while at the same time allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine him
about his silence. Most if not all of the prosecutor's questions on cross pertained
to the issue of Mr. Gallup's silence and it was the fact of his silence that the
prosecutor emphasized to the jury when he told them during closing that as a result
of Mr. Gallup's silence "I say you find him guilty" and that his silence "showed his
consciousness of guilt." (R: 186; 83, 89) When a constitutional violation has
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occurred it is the state which "bears the burden of demonstrating that the
improperly [admitted evidence] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt," see
State v. Morrison, 937 P. 2d 1293, 1296 (Utah App. 1997) and "did not contribute
to the guilty verdict." See Burson, 952 F. 2d at 1201. In the instant case it is
highly unlikely given the facts that the State could prove beyond reasonable doubt
that admission of Mr. Gallup's silence during the State's case-in-chief, crossexamination of Mr. Gallup, and closing argument, did not contribute to the guilty
verdicts. Therefore, the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and
there is a reasonably high likelihood that absent those questions and comments by
the prosecutor there may have been a different result, thereby undermining this
court's confidence in the final verdict. See State v. Harmon, 956 P. 2d 262, 268
(Utah 1998); see also State v. Mora, 2003 UT App 117, f 22, 69 P. 3d 838; State v.
Johnson, 2009 UT App 382, 1 37, 224 P. 3d 720; State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1, If 40;
State v. Dunn, 850 P. 2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993); Burson, 952 F. 2d at 1201.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons this court should reverse Mr. Gallup's convictions.
DATED this

4

day of October, 2010

_

Anthony V. Rippa/Brook J. Sessions
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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you're going to need to object again to preserve your objection

2

I consider your objection preserved.

3

MR. SESSIONS: Okay, and then I also wanted to preserve

4

an objection as to the officer testifying that my client just

5

hung up on them without further conversation.

6

that -- I brought up a little bit in chambers, but I wanted to

7

make sure I do it on the record -- is that my client has a

8

right against self-incrimination.

9

My argument on

Obviously when he hangs up, he's not making any

10

statements and he's exercising that right against self-

11

incrimination.

12

because he's over the phone, but whether he's in custody or

13

not he has a right to not incriminate himself and not make

14

statements.

15

Realizing he's not in custody at that point

So by the officer testifying that he made a call and

16

the defendant hung up on him, I believe that that insinuates

17

that my client was guilty in some way.

18

that it's inappropriate for that to be commented upon.

So it's my argument

19

THE COURT: Mr. Johnson.

20

MR. JOHNSON: I think, Judge, that under the Rules of

21

Evidence, I still think it comes in as either an admission or

22

that it's not hearsay at all by his action of hanging up.

23

think, you know, verbally saying something, "This is Jeffery,"

24

that's clearly a verbal statement.

25

I

That would be an admission.

Silence can be interpreted as an admission.

Again, I

-151

thin k it's from the defendant.

2

conversation

3

so and so," and then that person is silent.

4

cont emporaneous.

5

Again, he wasn't in custody so there wasn't any sort of Miranda

6

issue.

7

the totality of that conversation, however brief it was.

It's contemporaneous with the

It's not like the person said, "H ere, talk to
I think it's all

I think it comes in under the hearsay rule.

I know he concedes that, but I think it' s admissible,

8

THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Sessions?

9

MR. SESSIONS: No, I'll submit it.

10

THE COURT: I don't know anything under the case law or

11

the Rules of Evidence that would preclude that p ortion of the

12

conversation

13

that portion of the testimony to come in, and I' 11 note your

14

objection.

15
16
17
18

r

or that action from coming in.

Sc I will allow

MR. SESSIONS: Okay, and I won't make tl e objection at
the time the testimony comes in.
THE COURT: Okay, yeah, your objections are preserved
for purposes of appeal.

19

MR. JOHNSON: That's all that the State has .

20

THE COURT: Okay.

21

-MR. SESSIONS: No.

22
23

Anything else?

THE COURT: Okay, let's take our recess, and then it is
Judg e Davis's courtroom we're going to be in.

24

MR. JOHNSON: Okay, 301?

25

THE COURT: Yeah, 301.

Okay, so let's g et up there as
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find that these are business records.

2

MR. JOHNSON: Okay.

3

THE COURT: Go ahead.

4

Q.

BY MR. JOHNSON: Did you -- after looking at the

5

picture of Mr. Gallup that evening, did that seem consistent

6

with the brief description that you saw from the back of the

7

driver of the vehicle that day?

8

A.

Yes, it did.

9

Q.

Were you -- did you conduct an investigation further

10

into contacting Mr. Gallup that evening?

11

A.

I did.

12

Q.

I'm just going to -- if you can just answer the

13

question --

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

-- so we can steer the jury the right way.

Did you

16

obtain a phone number that belonged to the defendant that

17

night?

18

A.

Yes, I did.

19

Q.

What did you do with that number?

20

A.

I called that number from my office.

21

Q.

Okay, how long after this incident?

22

A.

It was probably -- approximately an hour.

23

Q.

Okay.

24

A.

About that, I would think.

25

Q.

Okay, and can you describe the substance of the phone

-36call to the jury, what happened when you called that number?
A.

Yes.

A male answered the phone, and I simply asked

-- in fact, I said, "Is Mr. Jeffery Gallup there, please."
The male voice on the other end of the phone said, "This is
Jeffery."
Q.

Okay.

A.

At that point I explained who I was.

"I'm Trooper

Clanton with the Highway Patrol, and I was wondering if you
could tell me your location.

I'd like to meet with you for

just a few minutes and talk to you about an incident," and
there was -- and then at that point there was a brief moment
of silence, possibly a second or so, and then the conversation
ended.
Q.

Okay.

A.

The person on the other end of the phone hung up the

phone.
Q.

So he hung up on you?

A.

Correct.

Q.

He didn't say, "Hey, I'm glad you called.

talk to you.
A.

I wanted to

Someone has my car," anything like that?

-No.

Q.

Just hung up on you?

A.

Yes.
MR. JOHNSON: Okay, that's all I have for this witness.

Thank you.
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them.

I've met with my client and --

2

THE COURT: Okay.

3

MR. SESSIONS: -- I just need a few minutes to go

4

through them.

I think most of them are standard instructions.

5

THE COURT: Right.

6

MR. SESSIONS: We have gone over most of them in

7

chambers.

8

THE COURT: The ones that had issues.

9

MR. SESSIONS: Right.

10

(Court speaks with clerk off the record)

11

MR. SESSIONS: Your Honor, I've looked through the

12

instructions.

13

to testify.

14

regarding the defendant is not required to testify.

15
16

I've talked with my client, and it's his intent
So I think that we can take out the instruction

THE COURT: Okay, do you want us to put back in the one
that says he's a competent witness?

17

MR. SESSIONS: Yes.

18

THE COURT: All right, so we'll pull out that one, and

19

I'll have Jenny print out the other one again.

20

two options from the two of you.

21

bit different.

Well, we have

I think they were a little

22

MR. JOHNSON: On the whether he testifies instruction?

23

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

24
25

you.

One was from Tom, and one was from

They were just a little bit different.
MR. JOHNSON: Judge, just since we have time to kill or

-53whatever, I'm -- the State is concerned, certainly, if he's
testifying that the State has not received any notice of alibi,
if that's -- I think -- I don't know any other way to not go
into that.
THE COURT: Let's get a microphone there.

Yeah.

So

your concern is that his testimony may -MR. JOHNSON: I think, unless he asks him what time
of day it is today or something, that if he talks about the
incident, it's going to necessarily implicate whether or not he
was present in the vehicle; and if not, then he's talking about
an alibi defense.
12:20.

That's news to the State as of January 5th at

So I think under the rule 77-14-2, that we need to have

that notice at least ten days before trial, so we can research
and investigate what he may be claiming.
THE COURT: It's a valid concern, Mr. Sessions.

Is

your client going to -- with regard to the incident, not the
phone call, I assume, but with regard to the incident, is he
going to testify with regard to anything that would be an
alibi, indicating he wasn't in the car that night?

Because

if it goes that direction, I think the State's correct; it's
an alibi ^
MR. SESSIONS: I think -THE COURT: I guess the second question is, is he also
intending to testify about the telephone call.

Hypothetically,

if that was all he wanted to testify about, I think I would

-55time as the Court may allow, file and serve on the prosecuting
attorney a notice in writing of his intention to claim alibi.
The notice shall contain specific information as to the place
where the defendant claims to have been at the alleged offense
-- time of the alleged offense, and as particularly as it's
known to the defendant or his attorney the names and addresses
of the witnesses by whom he purposed to establish that alibi."
Then it goes into what our duty is of the State to rebut that.
Under subsection

(3) "If a defendant or prosecuting

attorney fails to comply with the requirements of the section,
the Court may exclude evidence offered to establish or rebut
alibi.

However the defendant may always testify on his own

behalf concerning alibi."
Then under subsection (4), it says, "The Court may,
for good cause shown, waive the requirements of the section."
The State would argue there is no good cause.

This has been

going on for a while.
THE COURT: Do you want me to get a copy of the code so
you can look at the whole thing?
MR. SESSIONS: We need to look at that, because it
sounds to me like the defendant can always testify, according
to that code section.

Let me just be a little more clear,

too, because I had not intended that my client would need to
testify.

If I had been successful on the objection to the

foundation and the phone call evidence coming in, he would
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MR. SESSIONS: But if he just says,

M

I wasn't there.

I

2

think I was at this location, but nobody was there," that's an

3

explanation but not an alibi, as I would understand alibi in

4

the statute.

5

THE COURT: Well, but if he says, "I was at another

6

location," and that notice had been given, they could go to

7

that location and investigate.

8
9

MR. SESSIONS: But if he says, "I was at my home that
night," how would they be able to go to that location --

10

MR. JOHNSON: Well, because --

11

MR. SESSIONS: -- and know he was there or not there on

12
13

that night?
MR. JOHNSON: Well, because the officers actually did,

14

and he wasn't there.

15

that if he wants.

So -- but we did do that.

So he can say

16

THE COURT: Okay.

17

MR. SESSIONS: And we'll go to there.

18

THE COURT: So as far as any testimony that places him

19

definitely somewhere else, I think that constitutes at least a

20

partial alibi; and notice should have been given to the State

21

so that they could either check out that story or not, as the

22

case may be.

23

Now apparently there's testimony that the officer

24

could give that hasn't been given, that they went to the home

25

that night?
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for sure I wasn't there.

2

driving," it seems to speak out both sides of his mouth, and

3

that's where --

I wasn't

THE COURT: I don't think you can have it both ways,

4
5

I wasn't in Utah County.

Mr. Sessions.

6

MR. SESSIONS: Pardon me?

7

THE COURT: I think you can have it both ways.

8

he either testifies he doesn't have a memory or he doesn't know

9

where he was that night, or he doesn't testify as to where he

I think

10

was that night, because if he is going to say, "I was at a

11

specific place that night," then the State should have had

12

notice and should have had an opportunity to do whatever

13

investigation they wanted to do in order to try and either

14

corroborate his story, or to debunk his story; but I don't --

15

I don't think he can have it both ways.

So that's his choice.

MR. SESSIONS: Well, your Honor, I would argue that

16
17

the defendant always does have the right to explain himself,

18

because he is the defendant in a criminal case and has that

19

right.

20

That's an exception in the statute.
I would also argue that simply not knowing where you

21

are specifically doesn't mean that you can't exclude other

22

places.

23

that night, because I've never been to Switzerland."

24

say, "I know I wasn't in Utah County, because I had no reason

25

to go to Utah County."

He could say, "Well, I know I wasn't in Switzerland
He could

"I know I wasn't in Canada, but I don't
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know exactly where I was.

I was somewhere else."

2

I believe that he should be allowed to testify to

3

that, because he should be allowed to answer the questions

4

against him.

5

that the officers can do an appropriate investigation, but also

6

the defendant doesn't have a burden of proof, and the defendant

7

has the right to remain silent.

8

help the officers in all of their investigation.

I understand the alibi statute is in place so

The defendant doesn't have to

9

I would argue that if he has a specific location and a

10

specific person who that they could check out, that it would be

11

reasonable for them to check out, then the statute requires him

12

to divulge that information; but if he had general information

13

that says, "I don't know where I was, but I wasn't there," that

14

is a reasonable testimony from a defendant.

15

THE COURT: No, that's different from what I was saying.

16 I

MR. SESSIONS: Okay.

17

THE COURT: Okay, what I was saying is, sure, if he

18

says -- well, I was working on the assumption that he was going

19

to say he was specifically somewhere else.

20

testimony is,

21

I don't know where I was, but I wasn't on the freeway that

22

night," I th ink that's probably allowable.

I guess if his

XV

I just know I wasn't on the freeway that night.

23

MR. SESSIONS: Okay.

24

THE COURT: But if he starts to establish that he was

25

someplace where they could have investigated, that becomes an

-631

alibi, in my opinion.

2

MR. SESSIONS: Okay.

3

THE COURT: I don't read the -- be quiet, Mr. Gallup.

4

I don't read the sentence "However, the defendant may always

5

testify on his own behalf concerning alibi" as something that

6

negates the previous two paragraphs.

7

means if he wants to establish his own alibi and doesn' t have

8

other witnesses he may do so, but he still has to give notice.

9

I think that just simply

So in his testimony today, if he wants to get up and
xV

10

say either "I don't have a memory of where I was," or

11

I wasn't on the freeway that night; don't know where I was,

12

but I wasn't on the freeway," I mean , if he just wants to do a

13

blanket denial that he was speeding, I don't think the statute

14

precludes him from doing that.

15

I know

I would strike any testimony that starts to establish

16

a place where he was that night, as opposed to being on the

17

freeway at the time the officer was chasing this particular

18

vehicle that was registered to him.

19

an alibi and notice has not been given, okay?

20

worked our way through that one?

21
22

Otherwise, that approaches
So have we

-(Counsel conferring off the record)
THE COURT: I'm ready to move on, folks.

We've got a

23

jury coming back in less then 50 minutes.

24

instructions, I am a little concerne d, since identity is not --

25

identity is very important in this case, we don't have a long

Okay, as to the jury
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A.

I do not know.

2

Q.

This is your car, right, that we're talking about on

3

I haven't --

that night?

4

A.

That's correct, the car is registered to me.

5

Q.

And you spoke to the officer about an hour after that

6

incident, when he called you briefly, as you said, right?

7

A.

Correct.

8

Q.

At that point didn't it seem important to talk to the

9
10

officer a little more about the incident and figure out what he
was talking about?

11

A.

I was --

12

Q.

That's a "yes" or "no" question.

13

A.

At that time, no.

14

Q.

Didn't seem important to ask the officer more about

15

what he was calling you about?

16

17
18
19

A.

At that time, no, I did not know why he was calling

Q.

Okay.

me.
Did you ask the officer, "Hey, why are you

calling me?"

20

A.

21

Q.

I did not, and he did not relate that to me.
-Okay, did he -- why didn't you respond to him when he

22

said, "This is Trooper Clanton.

I've been on the freeway.

23

want to talk to you about some events that happened tonight"?

24

A.

I bel --

25

Q.

Why did you hang up on him?

I

-801
2
3
4

A.

I was under the impression he was calling on another

matter.
Q.

Okay, so did you then follow up with him about that

matter and ask more questions, or did you just hang up on him?

5

A.

It was my under -- my impression that he --

6

Q.

Now --

7

A.

was investigating another matter.

8

Q.

did you -- okay, so did you ask him about that

9
10

matter, or did you just hang up on him?
A.

I hung up on Officer Clanton at that point.

11

MR. JOHNSON: That's all I have.

12

THE COURT: Anything else?

13

MR. SESSIONS: Nothing else, your Honor.

14

THE COURT: All right, please be seated.

15

MR. SESSIONS: I'll make my second attempt at resting.

16

Thank you.

Now the defense rests.

17

THE COURT: All right.

18

MR. JOHNSON: The State still has no rebuttal.

19

THE COURT: All right.

Okay, with that I think we are

20

ready to give the jury the instructions as to the law; and then

21

following that the attorneys will make their closing arguments

22

to you.

23

follow along.

24
25

So we have copies of the instructions so that you can

I will do my best to read them verbatim.
goes better than others, but that's my goal.

Some days it

So if I back up
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As we've discussed, identity is the crucial issue.

2

What evidence have you heard today about that?

3

Trooper Clanton, who within 20 pounds was able to guess the

4

defendant's weight, was able to ascertain the male Caucasian

5

with brown hair, pulled up a photo from his DMV license, was

6

able to see that it was consistent, but he didn't stop there.

7

He continued to investigate, continued to narrow it down.

8
9

You have

You heard Mr. Sessions say, you know, "How many people
fit that profile?"

That's why we have our officers do this

10

kind of investigation.

11

down the defendant's phone number.

12

that they had.

13

Thankfully he did; he was able to track
You heard the conversation

That it didn't go very far; but Trooper Clanton was

14

doing everything he could in his power to investigate this

15

crime, to make sure that the defendant was the one.

16

was some sort of explanation he could offer Trooper Clanton to

17

get him away from realizing he was the real driver, that was

18

the opportunity to tell Trooper Clanton, and he didn't.

19

If there

I think that when you look at the totality of the

20

circumstances, you will see that the defendant owned the car.

21

He looked like the driver, was consistent with the picture of

22

the driver; and when he had an opportunity within that within

23

an hour of this incident, he failed to take that opportunity

24

to talk to the officer about the incident, to explain it away

25

somehow.

I

-89that the defendant's car is stopped, an individual matching
the defendant's car is behind the wheel, the sole occupant, and
that Officer -- Trooper Clanton calls the defendant.
no doubt who's the defendant.

There's

At that point, to get a call

from an officer, what is reasonable?
You heard him say, "Well, I thought he was calling
about something else."
you calling about?
clear this up?"

Did you then ask him, "Well, what are

Let's talk some more about this.

I was never -- I was not out there.

know what you're talking about.

Can we
I don't

I haven't met you before.

None of those things happened.
What happened was he hung up the phone.
reasonable to believe that he was just confused.
just exercising his right to remain silent.
said to you today?

Is that
That he was

Is that what he

Did he say, "I decided to exercise my right

to remain silent, and I hung up."

That's not what he said.

MR. SESSIONS: Your Honor, I —

the defendant's not

required to say that; and I think making comments upon his
exercising of that right in closing is inappropriate.

So I

would obj ect.
-THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection, although I
think enough's been said.
MR. JOHNSON: Okay.

Hanging up that phone, ladies and

gentlemen, showed his consciousness of guilt.
of 2008 he got away from Trooper Clanton.

On October 22 nd

Do not let him get
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ten minutes, I think if you're at your -- your office is still

2

up at Jamestown?

3

MR. SESSIONS: Yeah.

4

THE COURT: If you're at your office at Jamestown,

5

that's fine.

That will be close enough.

6

MR. SESSIONS: I'll probably be upstairs, actually.

7

THE COURT: Oh, let's see, Judge Howard's calendar?

8

MR. SESSIONS: Yeah.

9

THE COURT: Okay.

All right, well, let's see.

You're

10

not supposed to have your cell phone turned on.

11

MR. SESSIONS: It's on vibrate.

12

THE COURT: All right, so if you'll have it on vibrate;

13

and if you leave the building, you'll let them know that you've

14

gone, that will be helpful.

15

recess.

Okay, thank you.

Okay, so --

We'll be in

16

COURT BAILIFF: All rise.

17

(Re<:ess taken)

18

THE COURT: Okay, we are now on the record.

19

about 3:30 --- 3:30 by that clock, 3:32 by my watch; and the

20

jury has -- and I've got Mr. Johnson here in the courtroom,

21

and Mr. Sessions here by phone.

22

it have been allowed for the prosecuting attorney to ask the

23

defendant where he was on the night of October 22?"

It is

Here's the question.

"Would

24

MR. SESSIONS: No.

25

MR. JOHNSON: Why didn't -- yeah, the dang prosecutor

That was (inaudible) alibi.

-941

overlooked that one.
THE COURT: I'm inclined to do something like this.

2
3

"Due to an evidentiary ruling made by the Court, the prosecutor

4

was not allowed to ask that question."

5

whether that seems to be laying blame.

Now, the question is

6

MR. SESSIONS: (Inaudible).

7

THE COURT: Say that again.

8

MR. SESSIONS: Or you can put that neither party was

9

allowed to ask that question.

10

MR. JOHNSON: Either party was not allowed to ask --

11

THE COURT: Okay.

12

MS. SESSIONS: That the parties were not allowed to.

13

MR. JOHNSON: I'm fine with that, Brook.

14

THE COURT: Okay.

Should I preface it with, "Due to an

15

evidentiary ruling made by the Court," so that they understand

16

that this was a legal issue?

17

MR. JOHNSON: Yes.

18

MR. SESSIONS: Yeah, I think you should.

19

MR. JOHNSON: I'd like that (inaudible).

20

THE COURT: Okay, let me have a pen here.
Hang on a second.

Okay,

21

and let me do some writing.

Here's the

22

answer.

23

Court, neither party was allowed to ask that question."

24

either of you want me to ask something like, "You are not to

25

concern yourselves with the reasons for the ruling"?

"Due to an earlier evidentiary ruling made by the
Do

